Business Incentives and Employment: What Incentives Work and Where? by William Hoyt et al.
 
 IFIR WORKING PAPER SERIES   
 
Business Incentives and Employment:   
What Incentives Work and Where? 
   
 
William H. Hoyt  
Christopher Jepsen  
Kenneth R. Troske 
 
 






















IFIR Working Papers are made available for purposes of academic discussion.  The views 
expressed are those of the author(s), for which IFIR takes no responsibility. 
 
(c)  William H.Hoyt, Christopher Jepsen, and Kenneth R. Troske.  All rights reserved.  Short 
sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, 
provided that full credit, including (c) notice, is given to the source. 
 
 Business Incentives and Employment:   





State governments offer tax and location-based incentives to entice firms to locate or 
expand operations in their state.  We evaluate the effect of these incentives on 
employment using a panel data of Kentucky counties.  These data are unique because 
they contain information on actual incentives received rather than on incentives offered, 
an important distinction because the majority of incentives offered are never claimed.  
Because Kentucky offers incentive plans similar to other states, the results are applicable 
to other states.  Training incentives have a strong, positive effect on economic activity, 
whereas tax incentives have a more modest positive effect.  These effects differ with the 
location of the county, with almost no impact in interior counties and much larger, 
positive and significant impacts in counties along state borders.  There are few if any 
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1. Introduction 
The practice of local and state governments offering tax and other location-based incentives 
to firms considering locating operations in their jurisdictions, as well as to existing firms that are 
expanding operations, has become a common practice with no abatement of this practice apparent 
in the near future.  These incentive programs are used throughout the U.S. not only in the hopes of 
attracting very visible projects such as automobile assembly plants and high-technology firms but 
also to encourage existing firms to add new capacity and jobs. 
Although frequently used, these programs are not without their critics.  Undoubtedly some 
of the concerns about these programs arise from the lack of strong evidence, either supportive or 
critical, on the effects of these programs.  Even though a significant literature has developed 
examining programs that focus on economic development in specific areas, such as enterprise or 
empowerment zones or tax incremental financing (TIF), there is a very limited literature on 
incentive programs used by states.  The literature that has developed on business incentive programs 
has generally been theoretical and focused on when these incentives might be successful. 
The relatively scant empirical literature on incentive programs has been plagued by limited 
access to data on these programs.  In particular, researchers often know the value of incentives that 
are “awarded” to firms but do not know that actual amount of incentives firms receive.  This is 
because firms may be awarded a certain amount of incentives but they are only able to claim the 
incentives once they meet certain criteria, such as creating a certain number of jobs and actually 
earning a profit.  Because very few firms ever meet all of the criteria that would allow them to 
receive the full value of the incentives that have been awarded, there is often a large difference 
between credits awarded and received.  For example, between 1992 and 2002 in Kentucky firms had   2
claimed only twelve percent of the tax incentives that they had been awarded.
1  Therefore, 
researchers using data on the value of incentives awarded as opposed to the value of incentives 
received by firms will be using a very noisy measure of incentives, and their results will be biased 
toward finding that incentives have a small or no effect on outcome measures.   
In contrast, we have obtained a unique data set from the Kentucky Cabinet for Economic 
Development containing information on the incentives both awarded to and received by firms in 
Kentucky from 1992 to 2004.  With these data we are able to track the annual value of incentives 
received, by type of incentive, in each of Kentucky’s 120 counties.  Specifically, these data represent 
the cost to the state government of providing these business incentive programs.  Supplementing 
these data with data on employment in Kentucky’s counties from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) enables us to examine the relationship between state government expenditures on business 
incentives and employment changes in Kentucky.  
Although the incentive programs in Kentucky have a broadly-defined goal “to encourage 
economic development, business expansion, and job creation,”
2 we are more narrowly focused on 
the impacts of these incentives on local employment.  Other measures of economic development, 
such as earnings and property value, might also be affected by the use of incentive programs and 
have been examined in other studies (e.g., Greenstone and Moretti (2003)).
3  We focus on 
                                                 
1Based on authors’ calculation using data on Kentucky tax incentives from the Kentucky Cabinet for 
Economic Development (KYCED).   
2See the website for the KYCED at http://thinkkentucky.com/KYEDC/kybizince.aspx for more 
information. 
3Hoyt, Jepsen, and Troske (2007) also examines the impacts of Kentucky’s business incentive 
programs on earnings and property values in Kentucky counties.    3
employment because of its importance as a defined objective of these programs, the persistent high 
levels of unemployment in many Kentucky counties, and the fact that eligibility for many of the 
business incentive programs is determined in part by high levels of unemployment in a county. 
For several reasons, Kentucky offers a unique opportunity for examining the impacts of 
state business incentive programs on local employment.  First, the large number of counties (120) in 
a state of relatively small area and population means that when examining county-level impacts we 
are, in effect, examining the impacts of these programs on a relatively small area.  It also means that 
it is easier to examine any spillover effects on neighboring counties that are in close proximity to the 
county where an incentive is received.  The large number of counties, the shape of Kentucky, and its 
large number of neighboring states (seven) provides us a unique opportunity to distinguish the 
effects of these programs in areas bordering other states and areas interior to the state.  By doing so, 
we believe we can shed light on whether these programs simply transfer employment among 
counties within a state or actually have interstate impacts on employment. 
A number of findings emerge from our study.  First, although we find evidence of positive 
and significant relationships between business incentives and employment, the significance and mag-
nitude of these impacts depend on both the type of incentive and the location of the county.  Speci-
fically, training incentives and, to a lesser extent, tax credits have positive and significant impacts on 
employment.  In none of our specifications do we find that financing programs have a statistically 
significant impact.  These impacts are not uniform throughout the state—significant impacts of 
these incentive programs on employment, particularly in the short run, generally occur only in 
counties on the state border and not in interior counties.  It appears that both training and tax 
incentives help attract firms that, in the absence of these incentives, would have located or expanded 
in neighboring states.  We also find that, while tax incentives have a much larger impact on 
employment in MSA border counties, training incentives have a larger impact in non-MSA border   4
counties.  In addition to examining short-run effects of these incentives on employment, we also 
examine longer-run impacts (five years) and find these long-run effects are significantly larger for 
both training and tax credits than the short-run effects.   
We find little evidence of spillover effects from these incentive programs—the amount of 
incentives taken by firms in neighboring counties appears to have little impact on employment in a 
county.   
In the next section we briefly discuss the most relevant literature.  In Section 3 we discuss our 
data and in Section 4 we discuss our methodology.  In Section 5 we present our results on the 
relationship between county employment and business incentives.  Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Previous Research  
Numerous studies have been written on business incentives and their impacts on economic 
growth.  This section provides a critical analysis of this literature.  It contains separate sections on 
the impact of taxes in general and on the impact of economic development incentives in particular. 
2.1  Taxes and Economic Growth 
Many researchers have studied the effects of taxes on economic growth.  In general, these 
studies looked at the relationship between tax rates (such as the corporate tax rate) and economic 
growth.  Economic growth typically means employment growth, but some studies used alternate 
measures such as rate of return on investment.  Reviews of the literature often concluded that taxes 
have a negative relationship with economic growth (Bartik, 1991; Wasylenko, 1997)—higher taxes 
are associated with lower economic growth.  However, it is unclear whether higher taxes cause lower 
economic growth, or whether there are other factors that are associated with both higher taxes and 
lower economic growth. 
2.2  Economic Development Incentives and Economic Growth 
Even though a voluminous literature exists on the impacts of state and local taxes, few   5
researchers have explicitly looked at the effects of economic development programs on economic 
growth.  The lack of attention to the impacts of these programs is undoubtedly due, in part, to the 
difficulty in measuring the impact of these programs because data on taxes paid by firms, which is 
what are needed to evaluate these programs, are confidential.  Consequently, states typically have not 
conducted regular evaluations of their development incentive programs (Buss, 2001), although 
regular assessments are starting to become more common.  For example, North Carolina and 
Georgia now require periodic evaluations of their incentive programs.  However, Ihlanfeldt and 
Sjoquist (2001) claimed that only one of Georgia’s incentive programs, the job tax credit program, 
had sufficient data to be evaluated.  Faulk (2002) found that Georgia’s jobs tax credit created a 
modest number of new jobs, at a price below most other tax incentive programs: under $2,500 per 
job created (in 1993 to 1995 dollars).  The results from North Carolina suggest positive effects of 
their incentive programs (Luger, 2001; Luger, 2003).  However, these estimates are questionable 
since they are based on simulations rather than actual data. 
In addition to these state-funded evaluations of incentive programs, there have been a 
number of evaluations of incentive programs that have been undertaken independent of state 
governments.  These articles vary greatly in their statistical sophistication, their measures of eco-
nomic development, and the time periods studied.  Newman and Sullivan (1988), Bartik (1991), and 
Fisher and Peters (1997) provided the most detailed summaries of this literature.  The most recent 
of these summaries, Fisher and Peters (1997), generally found a positive relationship between 
development incentives and economic growth, but they also pointed out that the pre-1997 literature 
did not adequately control for differences across counties and states in general business climate.  For 
example, a county or state may use business incentives to level the playing field with other more 
attractive counties or states.  More recent work was aware of these county and state differences, but 
authors still often failed to control adequately for these differences (e.g., Goss and Phillips, 2001;   6
Gabe and Kraybill, 2002; Calcagno and Thompson, 2004). 
Using individual plant and firm-level data from the Census of Manufactures from 1972 to 
1992 merged with listings on the existence and nature of state development programs, Lee (2004) 
examined how these programs influence plant relocations.  He found that plant relocations account 
for only a small amount of the difference in employment growth across states and that tax incentives 
play only a small role in explaining whether a plant relocates in a different state. 
Greenstone and Moretti (2003) compared economic growth in counties that won “million-
dollar plants” with counties that lost the competition for these plants.  They provided detailed 
evidence that the winning and losing counties were quite similar before the plant was built.  
However, the winning counties had dramatically higher economic growth after the plants were built.  
Their paper provides compelling evidence that the construction of these plants led to higher 
economic growth.  In follow-up work, Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2008) found evidence 
that the construction of these plants also led to noticeable improvements in productivity for other 
plants (what they call “incumbent plants”) in the same county.  Because the authors did not have 
data on the size of the incentives, they could not say whether or not the benefits of the plants out-
weighed their costs.  Even with this limitation, these papers are considered the most informative and 
technically rigorous work on economic development incentives. 
Probably the most common localized economic development program is enterprise zone 
programs.  Hoyt and Garen (2006) concluded that enterprise zones do not have a clear positive (or 
negative) impact on economic growth.  Similar conclusions have been found for other localized 
programs such as tax abatement and tax incremental financing. 
A final piece of the literature review is to consider the effect of federal programs.  The 
federal government offered several tax credit programs in the 1970s and 1980s.  Bishop and Mont-
gomery (1993) and Perloff and Wachter (1979) found modest, positive effects of these programs on   7
employment growth.  However, Bishop and Montgomery (1993) estimated that much of the credits 
went to employers that would have hired workers even in the absence of the tax credit program. 
One of the most frequent shortcomings of studies of incentive programs is their failure to 
address the fact that these business incentives are not randomly given to companies.  Presumably, 
the companies that received the incentives were the ones that could benefit the most from the 
incentives.  Therefore, a simple comparison between firms that receive incentives and those that do 
not will likely overstate the benefits of the incentives.  Although many recent studies acknowledged 
this concern, they still failed to control for these non-random differences and therefore produce 
biased estimates of the benefits.  Further, these studies generally assumed that business incentives 
have immediate effects on employment, rather than allowing a gradual response to them over 
several years.  Greenstone and Moretti (2003) were careful to avoid these problems, but they only 
considered the existence of a subsidy rather than the type or amount. 
Our analysis of Kentucky’s incentive programs is an improvement on previous work for 
several reasons.  First, we use more than ten years of county-level data.  This is a much longer panel 
than has been used in previous studies, many of which were cross-sectional studies.  With a panel of 
this length, we can control for many of the unobserved differences among counties that are likely to 
influence economic activity in these counties.  Second, we use data on actual incentives taken by 
firms.  As we discuss later, the amount of incentives actually taken is much lower than amount of 
potential incentives offered to the firm.
4  Previous work has used much less precise measures of 
business incentives such as expenditures of state economic development agencies and therefore is 
biased towards finding that incentives have no effect.  Finally, we allow incentives to have an impact 
several years after the incentive is received instead of assuming the incentive has an immediate 
impact on employment.   
                                                 
4Faulk (2002) finds a significant difference between incentives offered and taken in Georgia as well.   8
3. Data 
3.1  Data on Incentives 
Our data on business incentives come from the Kentucky Cabinet for Economic 
Development and cover the period from 1992 to 2004.  The data start in 1992 because this is the 
first year that many of these business incentive programs were available.  The Commonwealth of 
Kentucky, like other states, has a myriad of incentive programs with some being very broadly 
defined while others are specific to a region or industry.  We aggregate these incentives into three 
broad classifications: tax incentives, training incentives, and financing incentives.
5  
We focus on the impact of tax incentives from the four largest tax incentive programs: the 
Kentucky Industrial Development Act (KIDA); the Kentucky Rural Economic Development Act 
(KREDA); the Kentucky Jobs Development Act (KJDA); and the Kentucky Industrial Revitaliza-
tion Act (KIRA).  When examining the impact of tax incentives, we combine these four programs 
together and treat them as a single program.  We do not examine the impact of each program 
separately.  We also have financing data from two programs, the Kentucky Economic Development 
Finance Authority (KEDFA) a direct loan program, and the Economic Development Bonds (EDB) 
program, and again we analyze the impact of these two programs together.  Finally, we have data on 
training grants and incentives from the Bluegrass State Skills Corporation (BSSC) program, which 
we also combine into a single training program.
6  We do not include incentives that are tailored to 
individual firms and – in some cases – require legislative approval.  Instead, our focus is on general 
                                                 
5See Hoyt, Jepsen, and Troske (2007) for more information on Kentucky’s business incentive 
programs.  
6Most training incentives are in the form of grants.  Job training credits were first offered in 1998, 
but credits comprise a small share of the money allocated to training incentives.   9
incentive programs. 
For each of these incentive programs, we know the total amount received by firms operating 
in a county between 1992 and 2004.
7  Unless noted otherwise, throughout this analysis we focus on 
the actual amount of tax incentives received in a year, as opposed to the actual incentives approved, 
since the former measure captures the true cost of the program.  The incentives received in a 
particular year vary across the three types of incentives.  Because most training incentives are grants 
designed to reimburse firms for training costs, firms receive training grants when they provide 
training.  Firms claim financing incentives, which are loans and grants, after completion of the 
project.  Firms claim tax incentives when two conditions are met.  First, they must meet the 
requirements, usually in the form of job creation, required by the specific type of tax credit.  Second, 
they must have a tax liability in that year.  
3.2  Employment and Demographic Data 
Our interest is the impact of incentive programs on county employment.  Our primary 
source of data on employment comes from the Regional Economic Information System (REIS) 
produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
8  The measure of employment reported by 
                                                 
7We know the credits received under the KIDA, KREDA, KJDA and KIRA programs.  We do not 
always know the credits received under the BSSC program, so we use amount approved when we do 
not have data on amount received.  Based on conversations with officials from Kentucky’s Cabinet 
for Economic Development, we feel that, for the BSSC program, the amount approved closely 
matches the amount taken. 
8For more discussion of the methodology used by the BEA to determine employment and earnings 
see http://www.bea.gov/regional/pdf/lapi2005/employment.pdf and 
http://www.bea.gov/regional/pdf/lapi2005/wagsal.pdf.   10
REIS is based on employer records and measures total employment within a county including both 
full- and part-time workers.     
To control for other aspects of a county that may affect employment growth, we supplement 
our data on employment with county-level data on demographics, school expenditures, and taxation.  
Yearly population data by age, gender, and race for a county are from the U.S. Census Bureau.
9  
From these data, we construct and include in our estimation a measure of the percentage of the 
county population that is male.  Also included in our estimation are variables measuring the 
percentage of the county population under the age of twenty, the percentage between twenty and 
twenty-nine, between thirty and forty, between forty and forty-nine, and between fifty and sixty-
four.  We also include, as separate variables, the percentage of the county population that is African-
American, Native-American, Hispanic, and Asian.   
The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) provides yearly data on per-pupil 
expenditures for elementary and secondary education, and we use these data in our estimation.  The 
Census of Governments has detailed tax and government expenditure data for each county for the 
years 1992, 1997, and 2002.  For non-survey years values of these variables are interpolated.  Using 
these data, we calculate total local taxes paid in a county, and include the natural logarithm of this 
variable in our estimation.   
4. Methodology 
                                                 
9The data on total population and population characteristics for these counties is based on 
intercensal estimates for the years 1992 – 1999 and 2001-2005 and is found at the Census site, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html.    11
To examine the impact of business incentive programs on economic growth, we employ 
panel data techniques.  An observation is a county and year, such as Bourbon County in 1997.  We 
have complete data for each of Kentucky’s 120 counties from 1994 to 2005.   
4.1  Basic Empirical Model 
Our basic underlying model for employment in a county is given by: 
(, , , ,,)
N Ef I ID G γ υ =          (4.1) 
where E denotes employment in a county; I denotes the amount of incentives actually paid to bus-
inesses operating in a county; I
N denotes the amount of incentives paid to businesses operating in 
neighboring counties; the vector D includes the total population of the county as well as measures 
the gender, age, and racial distribution of the county discussed earlier; and G includes per-pupil 
expenditures and the natural log of total local taxes in the county.  The term γ denotes unobserved 
factors that are fixed over time and that affect employment in a county and υ denotes time-varying 
factors that affect employment in all counties equally. 
  Because we believe that incentives are unlikely to immediately affect economic activity in a 
county, for our initial estimates, we control for incentives received by businesses two years prior to 
the current period.  In assuming that economic growth depends on the policies of preceding year(s) 
(lags), we are also following the long-standing approach in the literature on economic development 
to reduce concerns about the endogeneity of the incentives.  By this we mean the possibility that 
high levels of economic growth might be leading to tax incentives being taken by firms, rather than 
incentives leading to economic growth.  By having tax incentives in 1995 explain employment in 
1997, for example, we reduce this concern, as it would be difficult to argue employment in 1997 
leads to more incentives taken in 1995. 
Because the choice of a two-year lag for incentives is somewhat arbitrary, we also estimate 
specifications in which we include measures of incentives received by firms in a county in each of   12
the five years prior to the current period.  This more flexible specification allows us to estimate the 
effects of business incentives in both the short- and long-run.  Although it is possible that impacts 
of incentives continue beyond five years, each lag that we add to the model reduces our sample size 
by one year so we are limited in the number of lags we can include.  The disadvantage of this specifi-
cation is that we lose precision in our estimates.  Because our point estimates from the more 
restrictive model correspond closely with our point estimates from the more general model, we have 
chosen to focus primarily on the results from the more restrictive model.   
It is possible that business incentives received by a firm in one county influence economic 
activity in neighboring counties.  The impact might be through suppliers to a firm locating in neigh-
boring counties rather than in the county where the firm which they supply is located.  Or, perhaps, 
existing firms in one county experience an increase in sales volume arising from the increased 
demand by firms receiving incentives in another county.  Alternatively, expansion of business 
activity in one county related to obtaining business incentives might lead to reductions in business 
activity in neighboring counties.  Thus, it is an open question whether business incentives in one 
county increase or decrease economic activity in neighboring counties.  To try to capture possible 
cross-county impacts of incentives, we include the level of incentives for surrounding counties in 
some of the models we estimate.  We measure the amount of incentives received by businesses in 
surrounding counties by constructing a population weighted average of the incentives received in a 
given year in all of the counties that share a common border with a given county.
10 
Of course, employment levels in a state, region, or county are not solely determined by the 
incentives received by business operations in that area, nor are employment levels constant over 
                                                 
10Since we only have data on incentive awarded in Kentucky, for counties that border counties in 
other states, we only include incentives awarded in other counties in Kentucky.    13
time.  Therefore, any attempt to examine the influence of incentives on employment levels must 
attempt to control for other possible influences on employment in a region.  Because we have re-
peated observations on the same counties over time, we are able to include county-fixed effects to 
control for time-invariant, underlying long-term employment levels in each county that are unrelated 
to the tax incentives.  Analogously, observing employment levels in 120 different counties with 
different levels of tax incentives each year enables us to account for how employment varies over 
time within the Commonwealth due to business cycles and other time-variant influences through the 
use of year fixed effects. 
In addition to tax incentives, we include other characteristics of the counties that vary over 
time and are likely to influence economic growth in our estimation.  As discussed earlier, these 
variables include the total population of a county, the gender, racial and age composition of the 
population in a county, local taxes and spending on primary and secondary education.  Although 
these variables are included in all of the specifications we estimate, we do not report their 
coefficients in our results because they are not the focus of this study. 
Based on this discussion, the basic model of the effects of business incentives can be 
expressed as 
  22 ( ) () ()
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where t  denotes the year and i the county.
 11 
                                                 
11As it is frequently the case that counties receive zero payments from one or more of the programs, 
it is not possible to use a simple logarithmic transformation.  Instead, if we let x be the level of   14
4.2  Employment Growth in Different Regions 
  We expect that the impact of the level of incentives on employment growth may differ 
among counties in Kentucky.  Specifically, we expect that differences in the level of incentives 
between two interior Kentucky counties will have a different impact on employment than 
differences in the level of incentives in Kentucky counties that border other states.  Businesses in the 
interior counties of Kentucky and their neighboring counties are, for the most part, eligible for the 
same incentive programs.  In contrast, counties on the border are neighbors to counties in other 
states that are eligible for a different set of programs.  This being the case, we might well imagine 
that favorable incentive programs in Kentucky counties might lead to employment growth at the 
expense of growth in neighboring counties in border state. 
  For this reason we estimate equation (4.2) and (4.3) separately for interior and border 
counties, where a border county is defined as any county that shares a boundary with another state.  
However, it should be noted that when estimating a separate equation for border counties, we are, in 
effect, comparing how the level of incentives in border counties is related to economic growth 
relative to growth in other Kentucky border counties.  Analogously, estimating equation (4.2) with 
only interior counties provides an estimate of the relationship between incentives and economic 
growth relative to other interior counties. 
  In addition, as it is not unreasonable to think that incentives might have differential impacts 
in urban and rural areas, we also interact the incentive variables with a dummy variable indicating 
                                                                                                                                                             
incentives, then our transformation of the variable is ln(x+1), which, when x = 0, has a value of 
zero.  Given that the mean level of training credits is $28,923, the mean of tax credits is $428,097, 
and the mean level of financing is $252,274, adding one dollar to the level of incentives should not 
make much difference.    15
whether the county is part of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA).   
4.3 Specification  Tests 
One obvious question about any analysis that is similar to the one we are conducting is the 
direction of causality—do incentives lead to employment growth in an area or are incentives more 
likely to be taken by firms operating in areas where there is above average employment growth?  To 
reduce concerns that our findings are the result of employment driving incentives, we conduct a 
standard specification test and estimate a model in which we examine the relationship between 
employment from two years earlier and the current levels of business incentives in the county.  For 
example, we relate the employment in Clark County in 1996 to the level of business incentives 
received in Clark County in 1998.  If it is the case that business incentives are being taken by firms 
operating in counties with faster employment growth or simply more employment, we would expect 
a positive relationship between employment in a county in 1996 and the amount of incentives 
received by firms in a county in 1998.  Failure to find a positive relationship between earlier growth 
and the current level of incentives should reduce our concerns about the possibility that the positive 
relationships we find in our estimation are the result of employment driving incentives and not 
incentives influencing employment. 
Another possibility we consider is that our dependent variable is serially correlated.  To try 
and address this problem in some of our specifications we include the lagged dependent variable as 
an additional control variable.  Although this procedure has the advantage of controlling for trends 
in economic activity, it also has the disadvantage of introducing endogeneity: the lagged dependent 
variable is likely correlated with the unobserved component of the current value of the dependent 
variable.  We attempt to mitigate this concern by estimating a differences equation, as well as – in 
some specifications – using instrumental variables. 
4.4 Potential  Concerns  with Incentives Coefficients   16
If firms claim incentives in years when the local economy is doing well for reasons unrelated 
to business incentives, then we would be concerned that local economy is driving both the claiming 
of incentives and the increase in employment.  To put it another way, there is the concern that we 
are pre-disposed to find positive effects of incentives on employment because firms claim incentives 
only when they have a tax liability, and they are more likely to have tax liabilities in years with 
employment growth.  Although it is possible that individual firms engage in such behavior, we found 
no evidence of a positive relationship between county-level incentives claimed and county-level 
changes in employment in the same year.  This finding is consistent with the findings in the next 
section that incentives are very small in comparison to the overall economy. 
Training incentives have an addition reason not to be subject to these concerns.  The vast 
majority of training incentives – over 90 percent during our time period – are in the form of grants 
rather than tax incentives, and firms are required to claim training grants within a year of the 
approved start date of training.  Although firms can plan the timing of their training, they are 
extremely limited in their ability to coordinate the timing of when they claim their training grants 
once their grants are approved. 
5.  Business Incentives and Employment 
5.1  Trends in the Use of Business Incentives  
We begin our analysis of the use of business incentive programs in Kentucky by docu-
menting trends in the use of incentives.  Figure 1 shows the statewide trend in the use of the three 
types of incentive programs (tax incentives, BSSC training incentives, and financing incentives) as a 
percentage of total earnings in the state.  As is apparent from the figure, the most popular incentive 
program in the early 1990’s was financing but its use since then has diminished dramatically.  In 
contrast, the value of the tax incentive program grew fairly steadily until 2002, but then fell in 2003   17
and 2004.
12  The BSSC training program was a relatively small program in 1992 and has remained so 
throughout this period.  This relative stability in the BSSC program is not surprising given the 
statutory limits on the BSSC tax credit program and state general fund limitations on the grants 
program. 
Figure 1 also shows that the incentives received by firms in a year are quite small relative to 
the size of the economy.  No single program has ever paid out incentives greater than 0.12 percent 
of earnings and the values of all three programs together have never exceeded 0.16 percent of 
earnings. 
In Figure 2 we illustrate an important distinction between tax incentives and the two other 
business incentive programs.  Tax incentives are awarded to businesses that apply for them and meet 
certain criteria.  However, tax incentives can only be claimed by these businesses when they meet 
other additional criteria, such as creating a certain number of jobs and actually incurring a tax liability 
in a year.
13  Over this entire period, tax incentives claimed were approximately twelve percent of 
incentives awarded.  As we can see from the figure, the ratio of incentives claimed to those awarded 
is particularly low prior to 1996.  Claims, as a percentage of credits awarded, increased after 1996, 
undoubtedly due in large part to claims on incentives awarded in the early 1990’s.  Because actual tax 
incentives claimed represents the true cost of the program, in our subsequent analysis we focus on 
the relationship between tax incentives claimed and economic growth rather than on the relationship 
between tax incentives awarded and economic growth. 
                                                 
12Unless otherwise noted, in all of the figures we measure the amount of incentives actually received 
in a year and not the amount of credits approved. 
13This is also true for the other incentive programs — incentives are only received by firms who 
meet certain criteria.   18
5.2  Differences in the Use of Business Incentives among Regions in Kentucky 
  In our analysis, in addition to estimating the relationship between economic activity and bus-
iness incentives on a sample of all Kentucky counties, we also estimate this relationship separately 
for counties located on the border of the state and counties located in the interior of the state.  We 
also interact our incentive variables with MSA status.  This being the case, in addition to providing 
summary statistics for all counties, in Table 1 we also report summary statistics for border, interior, 
MSA, and non-MSA counties.  As shown in the table, employment in border counties is, on average, 
twice as large as employment in interior counties, not a surprising result given that two of the three 
largest metropolitan areas in Kentucky (Louisville and Cincinnati) are on borders.  Of course, 
employment in MSA counties is much larger than in non-MSA counties.  Of most interest is how 
the use of incentives, as a percentage of income, compares across these regions.  The value of incen-
tives is slightly higher in border counties than in interior counties, although none of the differences 
are statistically significant.  MSA and Non-MSA counties have approximately the same value of 
training (BSSC) incentives relative to earnings, but non-MSA counties have a much higher relative 
value of tax credits and financing incentives than MSA counties.  Some of these differences may be 
explained by program eligibility—many of the MSA counties, which have a higher per capita 
income, are not eligible for KEDFA, a financing program, and KREDA, a tax incentive program. 
  Figure 3 provides another look at the geographical distribution of business incentives 
throughout Kentucky.  To construct this figure we sum over all years of our data the yearly total of 
incentives received by firms in a county in a year relative to earnings in the county.  We then divide 
the counties into quartiles based on this sum, and this is what is depicted in Figure 3.  This map 
shows that the use of incentives is relatively disperse across counties in Kentucky, although the use 
in Eastern and Southeastern Kentucky appears noticeably lower than other regions of the state.  
This map also shows that the counties with the highest use of incentives relative to earnings are rural   19
counties with low levels of employment.  This should not be surprising as it is in these counties 
where the difference in one or two plants receiving these incentives would have the most impact on 
the use of incentives as a percentage of earnings.   
5.3  The Relationship between Business Incentives and Employment 
As discussed in the preceding section, in our basic specification we undertake a logarithmic 
transformation of both the dependent variable and our measures of business incentives.  In addition 
to including variables characterizing the demographic characteristics of the county (age, race, 
gender), public services (primary and secondary spending per student), and local taxes, we also con-
trol for the impact of time-invariant characteristics of a county that affect the level of economic 
activity and for business cycle influences on the entire state by including county fixed effects as well 
as year fixed effects.  Because we compare economic activity in a county with the values of tax 
incentives from two years earlier, our analysis is restricted to the period from 1994 to 2005. 
Table 2 contains the results from our initial estimates of equation (4.2).  The first three 
columns report the results from estimating the model using three different samples:  all counties, 
border counties, and interior counties, respectively.  While the coefficients on LN(Training)t-2 and 
LN(Credits)t-2 are both positive and statistically significant in our sample of all counties (column 1), 
inspection of the results with the samples of border and interior counties shows the positive rela-
tionship for all counties is primarily due to a positive relationship among border counties.
14 
                                                 
14 We have also estimated this model using the log of employment in an industry as our dependent 
variable.  Our results show that the positive effects of training and tax incentives occur on 
manufacturing employment in border counties.  It is not surprising that these incentives primarily 
affect manufacturing employment since several of the incentive programs are directed exclusively at 
manufacturing firms.     20
As we are estimating a log-linear model, the coefficients on the incentives are elasticities and 
readily interpretable.  For border counties, a ten percent increase in the level of training incentives in 
a county will increase employment there by approximately 0.022 percent.  Based on the results from 
our estimates using all counties, a ten percent increase in the level of tax credits will increase em-
ployment 0.013 to 0.015 percent. 
Although these elasticities suggest that these incentive programs have small impacts on 
employment, it is important to bear in mind that these programs are also quite small, at least 
measured as a share of total earnings.  From 1992 to 2004, BSSC training incentives averaged about 
0.01 percent of earnings; tax credits averaged 0.09 percent of earnings; and financing incentives 
average 0.04 percent of earnings.  The mean annual BSSC training award in border counties was 
$80,775, making ten percent equal to $8,078.  With mean employment in these counties during this 
period at 26,585, based on our results in Table 2, a ten-percent increase in training incentives is asso-
ciated with increased employment of 5.86 jobs.  Based on the results reported in column (2), a ten-
percent increase in tax credits in border counties is associated with increased employment of 4.08 
jobs, although it should be noted that with tax credits averaging $540,192 during this period, a ten-
percent increase in tax credits is over $54,000 which is significantly larger than a ten-percent increase 
in training incentives. 
One explanation for why training grants have a larger per-dollar impact on employment than 
tax credits is that, by definition, training grants are used to provide training for workers.  If the 
training workers receive is primarily general training, then this will increase a worker’s human capital 
regardless of whether the worker continues to work for the firm that provides the training.  So the 
training grant may have a more pervasive effect on the local economy.   
The fact that we primarily find effects of incentives in counties located on the state border 
suggests that incentives help convince companies that are considering locating in other states to   21
locate in Kentucky.  Presumably a company that locates or expands in a border county could have 
easily located or expanded in a county across the border in another state.  According to our results, 
companies’ receipt of incentives and their subsequent decisions to locate or expand in Kentucky 
results in employment growth that is larger than the employment growth that would have occurred 
in the absence of the incentives.
15   
  Table 3 reports the results of regressions in which we examine whether incentives have a 
differential effect on employment in metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties.  In these 
regressions we interact the value of incentives in a county with a dummy variable indicating whether 
the county is part of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA).  The results suggest that the effects of 
training incentives and tax incentives on employment seem to differ between MSA and non-MSA 
counties.  In column (1) we see that the effect of training grants is positive and significant for all 
counties, but the interaction between training grants and whether the county is an MSA county is 
not significant.  For tax incentives, the coefficient on the interaction between tax incentives and the 
MSA county dummy is positive and significant.  Looking at the results in column (2), where the 
sample is border counties, we see that the positive effect of training incentives only appear in border 
counties that are not in MSAs while the positive effects of tax incentives appear only in MSA 
counties that are also border counties.  In column (3), where the sample is interior counties, we find 
no positive or negative effects of incentives on employment. 
                                                 
15 We also estimated models where we interacted the incentives received in a county with a dummy 
variable for whether there was an interstate highway in the county.  Our hypothesis was that plants 
that are deciding between several states when making a location decision may want to locate near a 
major highway.  However, we do not find any significant difference in the effect of incentives 
between counties with interstate highways and counties without interstate highways.     22
5.4 Spillover  Effects 
  Table 4 reports the results from regressions in which we include the log of incentives of 
adjacent counties.  With the exception of a positive and significant coefficient on neighboring 
counties’ tax credits for the sample of border counties (column (2)), none of the coefficients on 
neighboring counties’ incentives are statistically significant, providing little evidence of positive or 
negative spillover from business incentives in adjacent counties.  In addition, inspection of the 
coefficients on the county’s own level of incentives shows both the value and significance to be 
virtually the same as reported in Table 2 when neighboring incentives were not included in the 
regression.
 16 
5.5  Long-Term Effects of Business Incentives 
In the preceding sections, we discussed the results obtained from estimating the relationship 
between employment in a county and the level of incentives received by county businesses two years 
earlier.  Our findings, particularly for the BSSC training program, indicate a positive relationship 
between the amount of spending on incentive programs and economic growth.  However, the 
models we have estimated may not fully capture the relationship between the level of business in-
centives in a county and the level of economic activity in the county.  Specifically, our approach 
ignores the possibility that it may take more than two years for the full impact of the incentives to 
                                                 
16 Table A1 in the appendix reports the results from models where the dependent variable is the 
difference between the (log) of employment in a county and the log of a population weighted 
average of employment in its contiguous neighboring counties.  These regressions again show that 
both tax and training incentives have a significant impact on a county’s employment, but only in 
border counties and that incentives received by firms operating in neighboring counties has almost 
no effect on employment in the county.     23
occur.  Alternatively, it may be that the impacts of these programs are short-lived, and after they 
have been received economic growth diminishes or even abates. 
To examine the long-term impact of incentives on economic activity, we estimate equation 
(4.3) that includes the level of business incentives from each of the preceding five years.  Revising 
our model in this way allows us to get a better indication of the long-term impacts of these 
programs, but it comes at a cost – the loss of three additional years of data to use in estimating our 
model.  These regressions cover the time period from 1997 to 2005. 
Table 5 contains the results from this more flexible model where the log of employment is 
again the dependent variable.  We again estimate separate regressions for the samples of all counties, 
border counties and interior counties.  By looking at the individual coefficients, it is difficult to 
determine whether incentives are associated with greater economic activity.  Focusing on the 
samples of border and interior counties, we find that for border counties the coefficients on training 
incentives are positive for all lags but significant only for lags of less than four years.  In contrast, 
although training incentives are positive for all lags for our sample of interior counties, they are only 
significant for lags of three and four years.  Tax credits have a positive and significant coefficients 
for the border sample and then only for lags of three or five years.  None of the tax credit coef-
ficients are significant for the sample of interior counties.  The coefficients on financing incentives 
are not statistically significant for any sample or any lag. 
A more intuitive measure of the long-term effect of business incentives is to look at the 
cumulative effect of incentives on economic activity.  Therefore, at the bottom of Table 5 we present 
an estimate of the long-term impact of incentives by summing the coefficients from the five lag 
measures of incentives for each type of business incentives.  The results show that training has a 
positive and significant effect on employment in all three columns, with a long-term elasticity of 
0.004 for all counties, 0.005 for border counties, and 0.003 for interior counties.  Recall that in Table   24
2 in our more restrictive model, the estimated effect of training incentives in border counties was 
0.002 and was statistically insignificant for interior counties.  The sum of coefficients on the lags of 
tax credits is not statistically significant for interior counties, but it is for border counties and equals 
0.005.  Again, this is much larger than estimates reported in Table 2.     
It should not be too surprising that there appears to be evidence of a long-term association 
between the level of training incentives and employment in a county.  Presumably training incentives 
are being used to train workers and increase their productivity.  In this sense training incentives are 
similar to spending money on education.  If the training is effective, then the enhanced productivity 
of workers will continue beyond the period when their training is received and the funds from the 
incentive have been spent.  This enhanced productivity should increase the demand for these wor-
kers, increasing both the level of employment and earnings in the county.  More surprising is the 
significant long-run impacts of tax credits in border counties.  This long-run response may indicate 
increases in employment from subsequent growth in complementary businesses and expanded retail 
and services. 
5.6 Specification  Tests 
One obvious question about our previous estimates is whether the effects are causal—does 
an increase in training or tax incentives in a county cause an increase in employment in the county? 
Or, alternatively, are incentives being taken by firms operating in counties that will have faster future 
growth than other counties and faster growth than these counties have had in the recent past?  To 
address this question we estimate regression models where the dependent variable is the current 
level of incentives in the county, and the explanatory variable of interest is lagged employment 
(measured in natural logs).  The regression models also include explanatory variables measuring the 
demographic and government characteristics included in equation (4.1) and in previous regressions.  
Data for training and financing are from 1994 to 2005, and data for tax credits are from 1994 to   25
2004 (data on credits claimed are not available for 2005).  Table 6 reports the results of several forms 
of the model, where the time period of the lag varies from one to five years.  Each coefficient comes 
from a separate regression. 
The results in Table 6 indicate that the level of employment in previous years is negatively 
associated with the current level of business incentives.  In several cases, the lagged employment 
coefficient is statistically significant at the five percent level.  Based on these results it appears that 
business incentives are more likely to be taken in counties with unusually low levels of employment 
and suggests that, if anything, we are understating the impact of business incentives on employment 
growth.  In the end these results reduce our concern that it is positive employment growth that is 
influencing the use of incentives.  Instead, they suggest that it is the use of incentives influencing 
economic activity in an area. 
Another possible concern about the specification of the model is that the dependent variable 
is serially correlated.  To try and address this problem we estimate a difference equation based on 
(4.2) of the form 
  it t it it it it D I LN E LN E LN ε υ χ α λ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − − ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 .    (5.1) 
Consistent with our use of two-year lags on our measures of business incentives, we estimate (5.1) 
using a two-year difference in all variables.  This also provides more variation than a difference of a 
single year in our explanatory variables, particularly the lag of employment and the business 
incentives.  Then our dependent variable, ∆LN(Eit), is equal to LN(Eit-1) – LN(Eit-2). The difference 
in the lag of employment,  ) ( 1 − ∆ it E LN , then, is LN(Eit-1) – LN(Eit-3).  The difference in incentives is 
defined to be the difference in the log of the two year and four year lags (LN(Iit-2) – LN(Iit-4)) and the 
difference in the demographic variables is simply the current level of the demographic measures less 
the level of them two-years earlier (∆Dit = Dit – Dit-2).  Finally, the error terms represent the   26
difference in the current errors and their values two years earlier.
17   
  The results from estimating this model using data from 1995 to 2005 are presented in Table 
7.  Columns (1) – (3) present the results for a difference equation that does not include a lagged 
dependent variable as an explanatory variable while columns (4) – (6) present the results when the 
difference in lagged (log) employment is included.  Finally, because the differencing of the data 
results in correlation between the error term (∆εit = εit – εit-2) and the lagged difference in the 
dependent variable (∆LN(Et-1) = LN(Et-1)-LN(Et-3)), we estimate an instrumental variables model in 
columns (7) – (9).  Following the instrument variable approach used in Papke (1994), we estimate 
this equation with the difference between the third and fourth lags of (log) employment, LN(Et-3) - 
LN(Et-4), as an instrument for the lagged difference in the dependent variable. 
  Generally the magnitude of the coefficients on the training and tax incentives are smaller and 
less precisely estimated than those reported in Table 2, but the general pattern of results for training 
and tax incentives is consistent with previous tables.
18  However, the coefficients are insignificant 
once we include the difference in lagged (log) employment (columns 4 through 9).  Surprisingly, 
when the difference in lagged (log) employment is included, the coefficients on financing incentives 
are significant or near-significant for our samples of all or border counties (columns 4, 5, 7, 8). 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
                                                 
17 Because the county fixed effects are time invariant, they are not included in the difference 
equations. 
18 The coefficients are smaller in the specifications with the lagged dependent variable (columns 4 
through 9) because the total long run effect is measured as the coefficient divided by (1-lambda), 
where lambda is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable.  Even after making this 
adjustment, the long-run effects are usually lower than the coefficients in Table 2.   27
Business incentives are used by every state to attract new businesses and entice existing 
businesses to expand.  In this paper, we investigate whether these incentives achieve their goal of 
improving economic activity in the county where the incentives are located.  An important contri-
bution of the analysis is that it focuses on incentives actually received by businesses rather than in-
centives awarded to businesses.  The actual incentives received are the most relevant measure of 
incentives, since they represent the true costs of the program for states and are a more accurate mea-
sure of the benefits received by businesses.  Our analysis uses a panel of more than ten years of data 
on incentives, economic activity, and demographics for each Kentucky county. 
Training and tax incentives have a positive effect on county employment, although the 
impact of these programs depends on the type of county.  Specifically, we find that the impact of 
business incentives is larger in border counties than in interior counties, with the impacts generally 
being statistically insignificant in interior counties.  A ten-percent increase in training incentives cor-
responds with a short-run increase of employment of roughly 0.02 percent or about six jobs.  The 
short-term effect for tax incentives in these counties is somewhat smaller, on the order of an 
increase in employment of about four jobs for a ten-percent increase in tax incentives.  The 
cumulative effect of training and tax incentives over a five-year period is even larger with the effect 
of tax incentives statistically significant for both border and interior counties.  We also find that 
training incentives seem to have a much larger impact on employment in border counties that are 
not in MSAs, but tax credits seem to have a much larger impact on employment in border counties 
that are also in MSAs.  Financing incentives have no effect on economic activity in any county.   
The fact that incentives primarily affect economic activity in border counties suggests that 
these incentives work by attracting businesses that may have otherwise chosen to locate in a 
neighboring state.   
None of the programs has any significant impact on employment in neighboring counties.    28
Additional analysis suggests that the positive relationship between incentives and economic activity 
is not simply attributable to firms in economically healthy counties using more of them.  In fact, we 
find that tax incentives and financing are associated with lower levels of past employment in a 
county.  We also find that current use of training is not significantly associated in any way with past 
employment. 
Our work provides useful evidence on the relationship between business incentives and eco-
nomic activity.  Although we find compelling evidence that training and tax incentives lead to higher 
economic activity, we do not examine whether the “price” of increases in employment and earnings 
associated with these programs is too high.  Attempts to quantify the benefits of increased employ-
ment or earnings would be a valuable extension and complement to the analysis we have undertaken 
here.  Because our evidence on the impact of incentives on the location decisions of firms is 
indirect, future work should also focus on providing more direct evidence on the question of 
whether incentives actually influence business location decisions or if they are given to companies 
that would have located in the same place even if they did not receive incentives. 
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Table 1 Means of Incentives, Employment and Demographic Variables by County Location
 
        
Sample All  Border  Interior  MSA  Non-MSA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Employment 18,757 26,585  13,539 40,671 9,734
Total annual value of BSSC training incentives 28,923 80,775  57,504 55,211 18,099
Total annual value of tax incentives   428,097 540,192  353,366 739,522 299,863
Total annual value of financing incentives   252,274 433,539  131,430 527,634 138,890
BSSC Incentives as a percent of earnings  0.0062 0.0128  0.0139 0.0061 0.0062
Tax incentives as a percent of earnings  0.0876 0.0832  0.0905 0.0631 0.0977
Financing incentives as a percent of earnings 0.0521 0.0500  0.0534 0.0324 0.0602
Total taxes (in thousands of dollars) 21,934 32,707  14,753 53,897 8,773
Per pupil spending  6,870 6,896  6,853 6,600 6,981
Population 50,441 67,317  39,190 97,196 31,189
Percent male  49.13 48.96  49.24 49.20 49.10
Percent under 20 years of age  45.83 45.97  45.74 46.28 45.65
Percent 20 -29 years of age  9.93 9.77  10.04 10.20 9.82
Percent 30 – 39 years of age  11.04 10.92  11.12 11.51 10.84
Percent 40 – 49 years of age  11.29 11.25  11.32 11.61 11.16
Percent 50 – 64 years of age  12.03 12.02  12.05 11.61 12.21
Percent African-American  3.89 4.94  3.19 5.44 3.26
Percent Native American  0.30 0.35  0.27 0.36 0.28
Percent Asian  0.35 0.42  0.31 0.63 0.24
Percent Hispanic  0.90 1.00  0.83 1.35 0.71
Number of counties  120 48  72 35 85
Note: All dollar values in the table have been converted to 2005 dollars.  All of the incentive measures reflect the amount of 
incentives actually received by firms.   
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Table 2:  Effects of Business Incentives on Employment
 
Dependent Variable  LN(Employment) 
Sample All  Border  Interior 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
LN(Training)t-2 0.001068** 0.002203*** 0.000546 
 (2.25)
  (2.99) (0.96) 
LN(Credits)t-2 0.001292** 0.001534** 0.000922 
 (2.05)  (2.27)  (1.01) 
LN(Financing)t-2 -0.000119  0.000220 -0.000276 
 (-0.37)  (0.51)  (-0.59) 
Observations 1440  576  864 
Number of counties  120  48  72 
R-squared 0.45  0.48  0.49 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p<0.1.  T-statistics that are robust to arbitrary within-
county correlation are in parentheses.  In addition to the variables reported in the table, all 
specifications include the percent of the population that is: male, female, under the age of 20, 
20-29 years old, 30-39 years old, 40 – 49 years old, 50 – 64 years old, African-American, 
Native American, Asian, Hispanic; the population, the per pupil expenditures, the log of 
total local taxes two year prior, and county and year fixed effects.   33
 
Table 3:  The Differing Effect of Business Incentives on Employment for Counties 
that are in an MSA
 
Dependent Variable  LN(Employment) 
Sample All  Border  Interior 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
LN(Training)t-2 0.001017*  0.002810*** 0.000262 
 (1.94)
  (2.99) (0.54) 
LN(Credits)t-2 0.000667  0.000439  0.000473 
 (0.95)  (0.55)  (0.47) 
LN(Financing)t-2 0.000176  0.000460  -0.000129 
 (0.48)  (1.11)  (-0.23) 
MSA*LN(Training)t-2 -0.000054  -0.002812** 0.001239 
 (-0.050)  (-2.43)  (0.67) 
MSA*LN(Credits)t-2 0.002842*  0.004807**  0.002241 
 (1.76)  (2.19)  (0.91) 
MSA*LN(Financing)t-2 -0.001075  -0.000533  -0.000931 
 (-1.48)  (-0.53)  (-1.04) 
Observations 1440  576  864 
Number of counties  120  48  72 
R-squared 0.46  0.51  0.50 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p<0.1.  T-statistics that are robust to arbitrary within-
county correlation are in parentheses.  In addition to the variables reported in the table, all 
specifications include the percent of the population that is: male, female, under the age of 20, 
20-29 years old, 30-39 years old, 40 – 49 years old, 50 – 64 years old, African-American, 
Native American, Asian, Hispanic; the population, the per pupil expenditures, the log of 
total local taxes two year prior, and county and year fixed effects. 
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Table 4:  The Spillover Effect of Neighboring County Incentives on Employment 
 
Dependent Variable  LN(Employment) 
Sample All  Border  Interior 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
LN(Training)t-2 0.001107** 0.002286*** 0.000556 
 (2.35)
  (3.19) (0.98) 
LN(Credits)t-2 0.001285** 0.001534**  0.000916 
 (2.02)  (2.17)  (1.00) 
LN(Financing)t-2 -0.000105  0.000276  -0.000332 
 (-0.33)  (0.63)  (-0.73) 
Neighboring LN(Training)t-2 0.000373  0.000379  0.000463 
 (0.50)  (0.45)  (0.45) 
Neighboring LN(Credits)t-2 0.001221  0.002514**  -0.000373 
 (1.22)  (2.08)  (-0.27) 
Neighboring LN(Financing)t-2 0.000033  -0.000582  0.000484 
 (0.11)  (-1.55)  (1.15) 
Observations 1440  576  864 
Number of counties  120  48  72 
R-squared 0.45  0.50  0.50 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p<0.1.  T-statistics that are robust to arbitrary within-
county correlation are in parentheses.  In addition to the variables reported in the table, all 
specifications include the percent of the population that is: male, female, under the age of 20, 
20-29 years old, 30-39 years old, 40 – 49 years old, 50 – 64 years old, African-American, 
Native American, Asian, Hispanic; the population, the per pupil expenditures, the log of 
total local taxes two year prior, and county and year fixed effects. 
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Table 5: Long Term Effects of Business Incentives on Employment
 
Dependent Variable  LN(Employment) 
Sample All  Border  Interior 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
LN(Training)t-1 0.000690*  0.001447***  0.000029 
 (1.81)
  (3.26) (0.061) 
LN(Training)t-2 0.000612  0.001570**  0.000220 
 (1.62)  (2.50)  (0.52) 
LN(Training)t-3 0.000932**  0.001250**  0.000885* 
 (2.32)  (2.28)  (1.71) 
LN(Training)t-4 0.000818**  0.000469  0.001105** 
 (2.23)  (0.89)  (2.18) 
LN(Training)t-5 0.000761*  0.000113  0.001052 
 (1.66)  (0.21)  (1.58) 
LN(Credits)t-1 0.000488  0.000111  0.001021 
 (0.96)  (0.17)  (1.44) 
LN(Credits)t-2 0.000330  0.000279  0.000419 
 (0.89)  (0.49)  (0.87) 
LN(Credits)t-3 0.000668*  0.001494**  -0.000116 
 (1.72)  (2.42)  (-0.23) 
LN(Credits)t-4 0.000825**  0.000820  0.000471 
 (2.22)  (1.27)  (1.09) 
LN(Credits)t-5 0.000746  0.002114***  -0.000480 
 (1.41)  (2.84)  (-0.82) 
LN(Financing)t-1 -0.000163  0.000195  -0.000227 
 (-0.50)  (0.38)  (-0.45) 
LN(Financing)t-2 -0.000251  0.000097  -0.000322 
 (-0.67)  (0.17)  (-0.64) 
LN(Financing)t-3 -0.000064  0.000274  -0.000154 
 (-0.19)  (0.59)  (-0.31) 
LN(Financing)t-4 0.000022  0.000312  -0.000232 
 (0.067)  (0.80)  (-0.51) 
LN(Financing)t-5 0.000110  0.000156  -0.000107 
 (0.34)  (0.33)  (-0.28) 
LN(Training), 5 periods  0.003812**  0.004848**  0.003291* 
      F-Statistic  (6.68)
  (5.83) (2.91) 
LN(Credits), 5 periods  0.003058**  0.004818***  0.001315 
      F-Statistic  (6.37)  (9.19)  (0.79) 
LN(Financing), 5 periods  -0.000346  0.001034  -0.001043 
      F-Statistic  (0.06)  (0.35)  (0.28) 
Observations 1080  432  648 
Number of counties  120  48  72 
R-squared 0.30  0.41  0.35 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p<0.1.  T-statistics that are robust to arbitrary within-county 
correlation are in parentheses.  In addition to the variables reported in the table, all 
specifications include the percent of the population that is: male, female, under the age of 20, 
20-29 years old, 30-39 years old, 40 – 49 years old, 50 – 64 years old, African-American, Native 
American, Asian, Hispanic; the population, the per pupil expenditures, the log of total local 
taxes two year prior, and county and year fixed effects. 
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Table 6: The Relationship Between Past Employment and Current Incentives
 
      
Dependent Variable  LN(Training) LN(Credits)  LN(Financing) 
Sample All  All  All 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
LN(Employment)t-1  -1.976768 -5.111994  -6.873921*** 
  (-0.74) (-1.65)  (-3.37) 
LN(Employment)t-2  -2.475753 -6.217269**  -7.468323*** 
  (-0.91) (-2.05)  (-3.50) 
LN(Employment)t-3  -3.415750 -6.757715** -4.705593* 
  (-1.23) (-2.30)  (-1.73) 
LN(Employment)t-4  -2.839672 -5.566308**  -2.466584 
  (-0.88) (-2.02)  (-0.78) 
LN(Employment)t-5  0.864171 -3.325211  -0.874053 
  (0.25) (-1.21)  (-0.30) 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p<0.1.  T-statistics that are robust to 
arbitrary within-county correlation are in parentheses.  In addition to the 
variables reported in the table, all specifications include the percent of the 
population that is: male, female, under the age of 20, 20-29 years old, 30-39 
years old, 40 – 49 years old, 50 – 64 years old, African-American, Native 
American, Asian, Hispanic; the population, the per pupil expenditures, the log 
of total local taxes two year prior, and county and year fixed effects.  Each 
coefficient and t-statistic are from a different regression. 
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Table 7:  The Relationship between Two Year Differences in Employment and Incentives 
   
Dependent Variable  LN(Employment)t  - LN(Employment)t-2 
Sample  All  Border  Interior  All Border  Interior All Border  Interior 
Estimation OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV  IV 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
∆LN(Employment)       0.613524*** 0.571215***  0.646548*** 0.630271*** 0.861201*** 0.562964***
        (30.5) (15.8) (25.2) (4.04) (2.95) (2.78) 
∆LN(Training) 0.000472*  0.001009**  0.000171 0.000293 0.000393 0.000205 0.000288 0.000080 0.000201 
  (1.76)  (2.12)  (0.55)  (1.13) (0.91) (0.64) (1.08) (0.17) (0.66) 
∆LN(Credits)  0.000780**  0.000722  0.000797 0.000294 0.000511 0.000014 0.000281 0.000404 0.000115 
  (2.23) (1.44)  (1.58)  (0.99)  (1.13) (0.033) (0.82)  (0.79)  (0.22) 
∆LN(Financing) 0.000176  0.000368  0.000011 0.000291 0.000487* 0.000127  0.000294 0.000547* 0.000112 
  (0.85)  (1.17)  (0.040)  (1.54) (1.92) (0.49) (1.51) (1.92) (0.44) 
Observations  1200  480  720  1200 480  720 1200 480  720 
Number of Counties  120  48  72  120  48  72  120  48  72 
R-squared  0.15  0.21  0.15  0.48 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.41 0.49 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p<0.1.  T-statistics that are robust to arbitrary within-county correlation are in parentheses.  In addition to 
the variables reported in the table, all specifications include the two-year difference in the percent of the population that is: male, female, 
under the age of 20, 20-29 years old, 30-39 years old, 40 – 49 years old, 50 – 64 years old, African-American, Native American, Asian, 
Hispanic; the population, the per pupil expenditures, the log of total local taxes two year prior.   38
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Note: Quartiles are ordered from lowest to highest, so that the 1
st quartile has the lowest value of 
incentives relative to total earnings.   40
Appendix:  Results from Additional Estimation 
 
Table A1:  The Effects of Incentives on Differences in Employment between Neighboring Counties
 
      
Dependent Variable  LN(Employment)–LN(Neighbor Employment) 
Sample All  Border  Interior 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
LN(Training)t-2 0.001549**  0.002438*** 0.001104 
 (2.56)  (2.87)  (1.39) 
LN(Credits)t-2 0.001450*  0.001967*  0.001173 
 (1.91)  (1.78)  (1.17) 
LN(Financing)t-2 0.000301  0.000671  0.000251 
 (0.85)  (1.43)  (0.51) 
Neighboring LN(Training)t-2 -0.000061  -0.000533  0.000489 
 (-0.087)  (-0.63)  (0.52) 
Neighboring LN(Credits)t-2 0.001050  0.001177  0.000629 
 (0.86)  (0.78)  (0.38) 
Neighboring LN(Financing)t-2 0.000458  -0.000093  0.000937** 
 (1.40)  (-0.19)  (2.17) 
Observations 1440  576  864 
Number of counties  120  48  72 
R-squared 0.14  0.22  0.18 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p<0.1.  T-statistics that are robust to arbitrary within-county correlation are in 
parentheses.  In addition to the variables reported in the table, all specifications include the percent of the 
population that is: male, female, under the age of 20, 20-29 years old, 30-39 years old, 40 – 49 years old, 50 – 64 
years old, African-American, Native American, Asian, Hispanic; the population, the per pupil expenditures, the log 
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